While it's not on the news, I'm watching the current fight in Kherson (and the renewed fight in the Donbas).
The "Kherson pocket" (a smaller version of the WWII "Falaise Pocket" I mentioned a few weeks ago) is not a large "counteroffensive," but it is interesting. 1/16🧵
What follows are maps, descriptions of terrain, locations of tactical battles, and their relative potential significance.
Without battlefield intel, I don't know details of what General Zaluzhnyi or Col-Gen Shaptala see, but these are my thoughts.2/
1st, some geographical reminders about Kherson (in light green).
-It's both a city & an Oblast (like a province)
-The Oblast is about the size of Maryland, the city is about 1/2 the size of Baltimore.
-The wide Dnipro River dissects the Oblast and runs to the Black Sea. 3/
The main M14 motorway runs from Rostov (in Russia), thru Mykolayiv & Odesa, into Moldova
It's a key logistics route (or, in Army talk, LOC or Line of Communication)
East is Zaporizhzhya, west is Mykolays'ka, to the South is Crimea.
Kherson is central & critical to S fight. 4/
A few weeks ago, UA started "shaping operations." I won't go into a doctrinal definition, but that means countering the enemies ability to affect ur maneuver.
UA used LONG & SHORT range artillery strikes, SOF, small unit teams, resistance/territorials.5/ voanews.com/a/ukraine-tell…
When the enemy (RU) is on the defensive & trying to secure ground, UA can strike at the time & place of their choosing. That's the advantage of the offense.
Having precision weapons (HIMARS) & good Special Operating Forces (SOF) contributes to that. 6/ greydynamics.com/ukrainian-spec…
Not only do these actions destroy (and shape) the RU forces so they are more vulnerable to attack, they also lower RU morale by killing a lot of RU soldiers & destroying equipment.
All that contributes to UKR - even with a smaller force - having greater freedom of maneuver. 7/
So as a commander, what would I do with that small force?
Same thing I would do with artillery: Target key enemy elements. Attack those that are the most vulnerable.
Shifting to the Kherson as the main attack was brilliant for many reasons. 8/
After successfully defending in the Donbas against repeated unsuccessful RU attacks, UA began shifting forces to Kherson when they saw an opportunity.
That opportunity was a large RU force in Kherson, with a river at their back & limited supply lines. 9/
Poor RU leadership pushed many BTGs over the Dnipro because Putin wanted Kherson City, Mykolayiv, and eventually Odesa.
But on the M14, there are only 2 Bridges across the Dnipro. Destroy those bridges...and logistics & a trapped force becomes a RU problem. 10/
In the last few days, UA has used HIMARs to "drop" the bridges, while also attacking RU forces
I won't draw military arrows or objectives, but reports indicate UA has been involved in intense fighting in Vysokopillya, Arkhangelske & Potemkine. (boxes on the map) 11/
There are also indications RU troops are falling back to the Beryslav Bridgehead (see box area on map) as part of a "refit" & "reconsolidate" operation.
Once there, it'll be hard for them to get back across the VERY WIDE river to escape (Note only 2 Bridges in Kherson). 12/
UA is targeting key RU w/ precision weapons, confusing a RU force that already has very low morale and poor leadership, with a relatively small combined arms (tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, logistics, etc) force.
All while RU has depleted BTG w/ little supplies. 13/
So while there is the potential for a lot of RU prisoners in this significant battle in the next few weeks, there's more...
There are early reports in the Donbas that UA forces have launched an attack over the Severski Donets River and seized the town of Ozerne (see below) 14/
While a relatively smaller victory, this action by UA in the Donbas is *after* the RU pulled forces to head south, again showing offensive spirit by Ukraine. 15/
Because I've been asked in the last few days "how's it going in Ukraine?" I thought these few tactical observations might show:
-the slow pace of what we should expect in coming weeks
-the offensive spirit & skill of the UA
-the quandary RU finds itself in 16/16
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WRT national security & global threats, an extremely dangerous time re US "foes." -Massive Russian strikes in Ukraine -Georgia's "frozen conflict" heating up. -Moldova dealing with Russian troops in Transnistria -Russian economy collapsing...due to Putin's wars --Assad flees to Russia 1/4
-China intimidates Philippines, assaults Hong Kong's autonomy, represses Tibet & Xinjiang, threatens Taiwan, blocks international trade routes -N. Korea troops & weapons in Russia, increases missile capabilities -Hamas destroyed, but Hezbollah, IJ, MB & the Africa terror groups still active. 2/4
-Piracy increases in Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions -US, Mexico & Philippines rated as most active human trafficking countries -Draughts, famine & other climate change factors + outcome of conflicts causes increased migration into US & Europe. -Domestic terrorism indicators rising. 3/4
Watching the Israeli operations in S. Lebanon today, as the IDF releases numerous photos of arms caches found in & near homes. 1/7
These are similar to what US forces found throughout Iraq when we were there.
Using civilian locations provides terror organizations w/ unique advantages:
- difficult to find
- difficult to target
- when found, striking/destroying results in civilian casualties. 2/
This morning, the IAF also struck a 3.5 km tunnel complex between Syria & Lebanon that provided a means of bringing those weapons to Hezbollah.
Between 0900-1100 hrs local time today, Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets & drones into N. Israel. 3/
A few thoughts on what occurred in two different conflicts yesterday...the use of "killer pagers" by Israel and Ukraine's attack on the large ammo cache at Toropets military base 300+ miles inside Russia.
A short 🧵 1/12
First, the pagers.
In this article (gifted) from the @nytimes, the author claims there "no clear strategy" for this coordinated attack.
I disagree. Having used electronic & signals countermeasures in Iraq, the strategy is clear. 2/
Terrorist organizations - unlike conventional militaries who have encrypted signal capabilities - must find ways to communiate. It is important to continue to disrupt & counter this ability.
In Iraq, terrorist use of cell phones allowed US and ISF to glean valuable information & disrupt their networks. 3/